Sheffer, Edith. Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain

Sheffer, Edith. Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Sheffer uses a geographic metaphor and object, Burned Bridge between Sonneberg and Neustadt, two towns in East and West Germany, respectively, to study how the Cold War border between two blocks, which divided Germany, became embodied in the German culture in general and local communities in particular, not simply like a dividing line, but as a kind of crooked mirror, a place of contrast, but also contact, a site which objectified relationships, alliances, sympathies and antipathies on both sides of the border. As Sheffer argues, “Burned Bridge offers a critical vantage point on the Cold War and Germany’s division,” (7) which allows to see how the East-West border became negotiated in social structures, political decisions and on the level of identities and how the East-West divide was created not just by decision makers in Moscow, New York, Bonn and Berlin, but also by ordinary people living on both sides of the border and internalizing the border in themselves.

The first chapter starts with an account of how two border towns of Sonneberg and Neustadt were occupied by Soviet and American forces, respectively, leading to the criminalization (including wide-spread rape) in both towns, but also to the use of occupying forces as suppliers of resources by the local populations (implying a certain accommodation and compromise) and consequent enforcement of measures to somehow supress this situation on behalf of military authorities on both sides, which included a stricter control over the border between American and Soviet sectors. Different measures (say, different ‘level’ of de-Nazification) also contributed to growing differences between the neighbouring towns.

The second chapter starts with an examination of large-scale population movement between Soviet and Western sectors (1.6 million people between October 1945 and June 1946), which led to official measures aimed to curb this flight from East Germany. A numerical increase of border guard, however, only increased problems, as American and German border guards either were arrogant or integrated very fast into local communities, so smuggling and people movement continued. The Soviet army regarded the border as transparent and violated it on numerous occasions; in general, without political decisions as to what to do with the border, keeping it and border communities safe was beyond control. Absence of legal regulations just increased illegality in the region. Local populations had to adapt to this situation, which changed the patterns of life & communication and reshaped the landscape in both communities. New ways of imagining and constructing the border also appeared, which marginalized and othered everything behind it.

Chapter three addresses the economic inequality between the two neighbouring regions, resulting from differing access to resources in Sonneberg and Neustadt. Local communities became actively engaged in these activities, which furthered the East-West division by stigmatizing Sonnebergers, who made up 90 to 95% of smugglers, as well as introducing new social tensions inside the communities (use of the language of moral economy to stigmatize border-crossers). This created a popular demand on both sides to introduce stricter measures of border control, especially in the East (Neustadters generally benefitted from the illegal trade, as well as from influx of qualified labor). The problem of illegal immigration was, however, pressing for both sides. Western media and public opinion marginalized and victimized them, fearing their burden for the economic and social system of West Germany. This contributed to the strengthening of the divide.

Chapter four starts with an examination of a football game in which the border became the midfield line. This triggered a chain of events (or, rather, objectified a trend), as American forces and Neustadters proved suspicious of this cross-border cooperation as staged and orchestrated by East German secret policy and threatening to their established order of things. Eastern inhabitants throughout the course of the 1949 summer organized several mass crossings of the border, undermining its status of a frontier and defying the efforts of both American and Soviet border guard to control their flow. At the same time, starting with 1949, the border became a site of increasing propaganda warfare, as Western and Soviet zones consolidated into states.

Chapter 5 looks at how East German regime attempted to seal the border between Neustadt and Sonneberg as early as 1952. It starts with the general political context, which led to the 1952 fortification of the border. She then discusses the forced deportations from border areas, especially focusing on how the lists of deportees changed to reflect local authorities’ and population’s views of whom to consider ‘unreliable’ elements. News or fears of deportation leading to suicides, flights to the West, open rebellions, but most commonly with scared submission. This also had an impact on those who stayed, by returning or petitioning or through them and their deportations being remembered in local communities. West German press reacted by describing these events as barbarity, furthering the divide by arguing that East Germans now live in an authoritarian state. During 1952 and 1953, almost 90 Sonnebergers defected a week, more than 2,000 in total.

Chapter 6 starts with the burning of Burned Bridge by neo-Nazies, assisted by East German border guards; Sheffer argues that the harsh reaction of authorities to this attempt at breaking the border marked their accommodation and decisiveness to enforce the East-West demand, not constitutive for their own statehood. It when explores changes following Stalin’s death, including a relative lack of any events during the uprising of 17 June 1953 in East Germany, as well as the introduction of a new form of cross-border communication, meetings across the barbed wire on Sundays. On the other side of the border, the growth of welfare contributed to the reinforcement of the border in people’s attitudes and discourse. New state regulations, especially on the Western side, hamper local initiatives to promote cross-border cooperation.

Chapter 7 explores East German techniques of surveillance and control over its citizens, as between 1952 and 1961 the country lost 2.5 million citizens (every seventh), usually young, educated and skilled. To prevent a demographic collapse, East German authorities started to address people’s needs, which opened the doors for manipulating the regime, pouring resources into people. Re-defining of fleeing compatriots as ‘problem’ one. Restriction of travel permits for West Germany (customizing travel), which allowed citizens for bargaining, as well as strained local administrative resources. Winning populations back (Rueckkehrers)-ca. 1 out of 1 refugees. Introduction of Stasi and techniques of self-surveillance, building of a panoptic society.

Chapter 8 addresses life in the Prohibited Zone, a rather privileged according to East German standards (a 15% bonus to salaries). Border’s permeation into nearby citizens life as a factor of its stability. Increased daily participation in border-defence practices. A certain militarization of East German borderland population. Cynical conformity. Increased Stasi activities. In sum, a new normalcy emerged out of this situation, to which people were perfectly adapted and which adapted people to itself.

Chapter 9 approaches the 1980s and argues that despite all this, the border remained a dynamic, uncertain space. She focuses on the ways people were crossing the border, arguing that often it was an impulsive act, a sign of a new subculture emerging here. Soldiers as another dynamic component of the borderland. The border itself as a volatile object, with moving mines, waste flowing across the border, etc.

Chapter 10 explores different ways in which the border was imagined; Sheffer here argues that the ways of imagining the border led to a further estrangement. Bourder tourism as a way to almost orientalise and certainly exoticise East Germany as a land behind the barbed wire. Stasi infiltration in the West. Relaxation of Eastern travel to the West as another source of tensions in East Germany. In the end, Sheffer argues that the border regime held stronger than elsewhere in East Germany and fell not as a result of cross-border contacts, but due to strains in other areas.

Conclusion: opening of the border in 1989 lead not only to the reunification of two Germanies, but to realization of decades-old prejudices, esp. those of West Germans about their Eastern compatriots.