Monday 1 October 2012

Plaggenborg, Stefan. Revolution and Culture. Cultural guidelines in the period between the October Revolution and the Stalinist age.



Плаггенборг Шт. Революция и культура. Культурные ориентиры в период между Октябрьской революцией и эпохой сталинизма. СПб.: Журнал Нева, 2000.

Plaggenborg identifies the first post-revolutionary decade as an experience of total cultural transformation driven by Bolshevik ideology and practical necessities and restrictions and aims to study specific features of this era, taking as separate cases (book chapters) different fields of cultural production, including physical culture, a new culture of reading, radio, posters, cinematography, museums and, finally, feasts. In a way, this is an attempt to study how the new Soviet man was formed through different spheres of cultural production, an “anthropological dimension of the early Soviet history” (15). Also a certain teleological agenda to try “show in outline what can be defined as ‘ideological predecessors and ideological preparation of Stalinism’.” (13). His methodological part in Introduction is, by the way, very contradictory (he discusses theories of political culture only to reject them (!) and pledge allegiance to cultural analysis a-la Clifford Geertz.

Chapter 1 focuses on Bolshevik ideas in the sphere of cultural construction. Plaggenborg starts by arguing that in the 1930s, a new bureaucratic elite came to power which brought into it new cultural meanings which were then embodied in the process of Soviet development; this elite was into material possessions and private life as opposed to cultural guidelines of the early Soviet time. It was a failure of Soviet cultural revolution (32). He then traces the origins of this failed cultural revolution to early Bolshevik writing, arguing that they intended to change to mentality (sic!) of people by imposing on them their own mental makeup. He, however, fails to provide a description of what kind of character this future Soviet man had to inculcate in himself, according to Bolshevik ideologists: his main conclusion is overly obvious: “instead of studying the human constitution, cultural planners were engaged in its construction; instead of suggesting a realistic way for the development of what they had at hand, they preluded (sic!) the future” (51). He makes some observations on Bolshevik desires to “transform the everyday life (byt),” since their materialism dictated that cultural transformation would follow changes in material environment, but only in passing (53-55). Technical utopianism – in a similar manner.

In Chapter 2, Plaggenborg explores competing conceptions of physical culture (prior to 1923): as part of the production process, militarized and hygienist. He brings in ideas that social Darwinism and eugenics were influential among enthusiasts of physical culture in the Soviet Union. His conclusions are sometimes too overgeneralizing: he argues, on the basis of analysis of works by a rather low-rank Communist functionary, that “misunderstanding” of Social Darwinism and eugenic project “prevented the development of a situation similar to the one in Germany during National Socialism.” (116) Here’s a problem that often arises in the field of Soviet studies: a tendency to regard historical development as driven by some kind of uniform Bolshevik ideology, in a kind of “you’ve read one work, you’ve read them all” fashion.

Chapter 3 focuses on the early Soviet printed production (literature and press) and is interesting from a perspective that Plaggenborg looks exactly at the process of mechanical (re)-production of press and literature, rather than on the process of writing. He makes an interesting comparison between this production and consumption of literature by analyzing Soviet library collections; his conclusions are interesting, but very restricted: “the regime’s printed production did not meet the popular demand… State interests were always made the cornerstone…” (162) “The meaning of it can be clarifies only if we interpret this process as a reflection of the regime for its own consumption. Works published at all costs were a marker of presence, especially in those places where party and state institutions didn’t practically exist. They represented, substituted the state, its agents and the party, which did not exist at the institutional level. Several brochures, at least one newspaper, were compulsorily sent to those places where the party and the state couldn’t reach.” (163) – it certainly worked that way, but early Soviet printed production was never just a “marker of presence,” it did play its part in the construction of the new symbolic order – something which Plaggenborg totally misses.

Chapter 4 focuses on the radio and its main message, and here Plaggenborg mostly duplicates earlier debates on the role of radio in securing popular support among Soviet population – the chapter is less than 20 pages, so was it worth the effort? His fifth chapter analyzes the early Soviet poster, and here his thesis is arguably very reductionist: he claims that the heyday of the Soviet poster took place during the Civil War, while after 1921 the poster as a genre experienced a very notable decay, “died as an artistic phenomenon,” in terms of Plaggenborg (208). His argumentation is that the style based on elements of racism and social Darwinism (197-8) allowed for a creation of very powerful images of enemies which mobilized Soviet public opinion and population during the Civil War, but since 1921, “the main problem was that there were no more true enemies” (208) – not very convincing.

Chapter 6 deals with the early Soviet cinematography, and the main message of Plaggenborg here is that during the 1920s it was a total failure: to write at least something, he focuses on the cinematographic policy of the first years of Stalinism, which undermines the border of his own research. Not surprisingly, the conclusion to this chapter (the very last sentence) is about the heyday of the Stalinist cinematography (238). Chapters 7 and 8 examine two interesting phenomena: education of Soviet people through tourism (7) and museum (8). In both cases, the Soviet state and intellectuals with whom it cooperated pursued a clearly enlightening agenda, and the material examined in this chapter is very interesting; it’s a pity that their analytical part is second to the descriptive part in these two chapters. The chapter on museums is concluded with a mixture of statements directly borrowed from sources (“expositions failed to reach Marxist standards…” and in the same sentence: “fruits of rational and productive work of previous years were destroyed” – 285). The logic in the very last sentence is murderous: in the 1930s, he argues, despite 21mln registered visits (which he interprets as the number of visitors), people “attended museums reluctantly and only in groups, while in the early 1920s they came to museums voluntarily, that is, alone.” (286) Turn off the light.

The last chapter again involves an interesting problem and interesting material: Soviet holidays. The material Plaggenborg analyzes show how holidays become a medium to enlighten, educate, discipline and organize Soviet population into orderly subjects, on p. 314-315, in particular  - there is a quintessential statement that Soviet leaders wanted to use holidays “in the interests of socialist inculcation, education and organization of masses” (315). But Plaggenborg seems unaware of contemporary theories of cultural analysis, which is strange for a scholar of his stance. On p. 288, e.g., he argues that “[Soviet] holidays had nothing to do with public education… and speaking of holidays, we enter the sphere which is on the face value alien to political temper (!) of Bolsheviks” – all this despite a huge scholarly body of literature which analyze modern holidays and festivals as an integral part of the modern visual culture, to which museums, tourism and cinematography obviously belong. As a result, he violates his material to make the following conclusion: “[Soviet] holidays degenerated into pomp, artificiality and marching exercises… Didn’t it happen because that was the will of the state (sic!) which had certain designs for it? Wasn’t there precise calculations behind this form?” (320) – only to say no, the symbolism of Soviet holidays was too eschatological and mythological, and “in the symbolic message of holidays, there was no place for rationality, no reason that Politprosvet otherwise pursued in each of its lines.” (321) How was this statement supported with argument and evidence – that’s a question for me.

In Conclusion, Plaggenborg combines in the same proportion interesting thoughts with ideas that can be characterized as weird (or unjustified by his argumentation and evidence, to put it in another way). First, he argues that Bolsheviks were too revolutionary that their cultural projects could become viable. Second, there were two groups of Bolshevik enlighteners, one—old specialists—“clever,” the second—radical revolutionaries—too fast. Third, he introduces a third group, which advocated idea that bourgeois order defragmented personality and revolution should bring it back into one piece. He adds that Bolshevik enlighteners extensively used new revolutionary mythologies to pursue their ideas, which brings him to a statement that “in the sphere of culture, spiritual baggage of many revolutionaries demonstrated immunity to Marx, Engels and Lenin” and then enunciate two common places: that not only Bolsheviks were involved in the making of new Soviet culture and that there was no single Bolshevik cultural project (327). Was this kind of conclusion worth writing (and reading) a whole book? A disappointment.

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