P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr William, Asia and the Progress of Civil Society

Chapter 5, “Asia and the Progress of Civil Society,” P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr William, The Great Map of Mankind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 128-154.

The authors give an account of European views on Asia as a stable and unchanging society/civilization. Initially, until the 18^th century, the seemingly stable Asian societies were used by different political groups in Europe in political debates over the visions of their national futures: many, e.g., including Jonathan Swift, regarded China as an exemplary society, while rapid social change in England was deemed as something negative. In the 18^th century, however, the general views on Asian societies among intellectuals start to change, as more and more regard lack of social/political/technological progress in them as a negative sign. The authors then focus on environmental explanations of the slow social progress in Asia and take Montesquieu’s writing as an example, as he thought Asia lacked moderate climate like in Europe and lived between two extremes of harsh Northern and lavish Southern climates which did not encourage progress. From the very beginning, however, Montesquieu’s environmental explanation was challenge both by empirical data and other philosophers like Hume, who emphasized moral factors—namely, despotism as the form of government. Yet even this view was challenged from the very beginning, as Voltair and some others claimed that despotism was much less common than commonly believed in Europe.

Yet despite diverse opinions, the one about Oriental despotism ultimately came to dominate in the 18^th century. On p. 142, the authors show that the common knowledge among European intellectuals was that universal despotism was the reason of Asian stagnation. Traditional religions (Islam, Hinduism) were regarded as another factor for stagnation in Asia. In trying to explain the same things for China, the religion was replaced with collectivism. Finally, unrestrained sexuality of Orientals was regarded as yet another factor of stagnation.

The authors conclude the chapter by arguing that the Orient, and China in particular, was “sometimes” used as an example “of what Britain should avoid.” (p. 150). Yet it seems more likely that the entire body of writing about the Orient was one huge speech act aimed by its authors to shape the future of their nations in an “appropriate” way. The Orient mattered only as long as it was an instrument to understand European societies.